Mortgage Default, Foreclosure, and Bankruptcy by Wenli Li & Michelle J. White
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We are grateful to Mark Watson at the Kansas Fed for his invaluable support on the LPS mortgage
data, to Susheela Patwari for very capable research assistance and to Gordon Dahl for very helpful
comments.  The views expressed here are the authors’ and do not represent those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, the Federal Reserve System, or the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Wenli Li and Michelle J. White. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Mortgage Default, Foreclosure, and Bankruptcy
Wenli Li and Michelle J. White




In this paper we examine the relationship between homeowners’ bankruptcy decisions and their mortgage
default decisions and the relationship between homeowners’ bankruptcy decisions and lenders’ decisions
to foreclose.   In theory, both relationships could be either substitutes or complements.  Bankruptcy
and default tend to be substitutes because homeowners’ budgets are limited and, if they spend less
on payments to unsecured lenders, then they have more money to pay their mortgages.  But bankruptcy
and default may also be complements if homeowners use bankruptcy to reduce the cost of defaulting
on their mortgages.  Bankruptcy and foreclosure  similarly may be either substitutes or complements.
In fact we show that both relationships are complementary, although homeowners reacted to the 2005
bankruptcy reform by treating them as substitutes.  
We also show that bankruptcies, defaults and foreclosures all tend to spread, i.e., higher bankruptcy
rates in the neighborhood raise homeowners’ probability of filing, higher default rates raise homeowners’
probability of defaulting, and higher foreclosure rates raise homeowners’ probability of foreclosure.
We provide estimates of the size of these effects.
The paper argues that these relationships have important public policy implications.   In particular,
foreclosures have very high social costs, and some of these costs are external to both borrowers and
lenders.  As a result, there is a social gain from discouraging bankruptcies, since fewer bankruptcies
mean fewer defaults and foreclosures.   We show that these considerations shift optimal bankruptcy
law in a pro-creditor direction, because pro-creditor bankruptcy policies reduce the number of filings
and therefore reduce foreclosures.  But the same considerations shift other policies that affect bankruptcy
in a pro-debtor direction.   This is because pro-debtor shifts in, for example, wage garnishment policy
reduce the number of bankruptcy filings and therefore reduce foreclosures.
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I.  Introduction 
 
       The financial crisis of 2008 and the current recession were triggered by the bursting of the 
housing bubble and the subprime mortgage crisis that began in late 2006/early 2007.   In this 
paper, we investigate whether personal bankruptcy law also played a role in creating the 
mortgage crisis or in making it worse.   In particular, we show that there is a strong and 
previously unnoticed relationship between homeowners’ decisions to default on their mortgages 
and their decisions to file for bankruptcy.   In theory, bankruptcy and default could be either 
substitutes or complements.   They would be substitutes if homeowners use bankruptcy to save 
their homes, assuming that they succeed in avoiding default.  Alternately, they would be 
complements if homeowners use bankruptcy to reduce the cost of defaulting on their mortgages, 
in which case they would be observed to do both or neither.   In fact we show that the 
bankruptcy/default relationship is complementary for most homeowners.  We also show that the 
relationship between foreclosure and bankruptcy is also complementary.  But we find that 
homeowners responded to the 2005 bankruptcy reform by treating bankruptcy as a substitute for 
default and foreclosure.   
       The paper argues that these relationships have important public policy implications.   In 
particular, foreclosures have very high social costs, and some of these costs are external to both 
borrowers and lenders.  As a result, there is a social gain from discouraging bankruptcy filings, 
since fewer bankruptcies would also mean fewer defaults and foreclosures.   We show that these 
considerations shift optimal bankruptcy law in a pro-creditor direction and shift other policies 
that affect the number of bankruptcy filings in a pro-debtor direction.   
      To give some background on why the bankruptcy/mortgage default relationship has not been 
recognized, figure 1 shows the bankruptcy filing and mortgage default rates from 1980 to 2008.   
Both are scaled to equal one in 1980.  The diagram suggests that the mortgage default rate was 
fairly steady over the period—the fraction of mortgage debt that defaulted was around 5% in the 
1980s, dropped to 4.5% in the 1990s and early 2000s, and did not begin rising until 2007.  In 
contrast, the bankruptcy filing rate has risen steadily:  between 1980 and 2004, it increased from 
3.5 to 14 per 1,000 households.   A major bankruptcy reform went into effect in late 2005 that 
made bankruptcy law more pro-creditor and the filing rate responded by jumping to 18 per 1,000 3 
 
households in 2005, as debtors rushed to file under the old rules.  It then dropped sharply to 5.2  
in 2006, but since then has resumed its upward trend in 2007, rising to 9.2 per 1,000 households 
in 2008. 
1  If we run a regression explaining the bankruptcy filing rate as a function of the 
mortgage default rate, the coefficient of the default rate is negative and not statistically 
significant.   Thus aggregate data over a long time period suggest little relationship between 
bankruptcy and mortgage default.   
        But the picture changes if we examine micro data over a more recent time period.  We use 
the LPS data, a large dataset of mortgages that are followed every month.  Our sample consists 
of prime and subprime mortgages that originated in 2004 or 2005 and are followed monthly from 
origin until they are paid off, go into foreclosure, or until the end of our sample period in October 
2008.
 2   Mortgage default is defined to occur when homeowners are delinquent on their 
payments by one month or more.  We also know when homeowners file for bankruptcy and 
when lenders begin the foreclosure process.  Figure 2 shows monthly default rates, foreclosure 
rates, and bankruptcy filing rates, with prime and subprime mortgages shown separately.  The 
period covered includes both the October 2005 bankruptcy reform and the start of the mortgage 
crisis.   Using this data, the correlation coefficients between bankruptcy and mortgage default 
and between bankruptcy and foreclosure are .62 and .87, respectively.   For subprime mortgages, 
the correlations are .86 and .87, respectively.  Thus recent data suggest that homeowners’ default 
and bankruptcy decisions are closely related and that homeowners’ bankruptcy decisions are 
closely related to the start of foreclosure.  
         To examine these relationships further, consider the timing of homeowners’ bankruptcy 
decisions relative to when they default.  For all homeowners in the sample who default, we set 
the month of default to zero and calculate the cumulative probability that homeowners file for 
bankruptcy each month before and after default.  The results are shown in figure 3, with separate 
curves for prime and subprime mortgages.   Homeowners tend to file for bankruptcy after they 
default rather than before, with most homeowners filing within a year after default.  Eventually, 
                                                            
1 Table 1 gives these data and data sources.   We have not been able to locate any historical data 
on foreclosures.    
2 If homeowners default, then become current and then default again, we include both defaults 
for purposes of computing the average monthly default rates.     4 
 
around 6% of homeowners with prime mortgages and 9% of homeowners with subprime 
mortgages who default also file for bankruptcy.   
        Now consider the default decisions of homeowners who file for bankruptcy.  For all 
homeowners who file for bankruptcy, we set the month of bankruptcy to zero and calculate the 
cumulative probability of default each month before and after bankruptcy.  The results are shown 
in figure 4.  The timing pattern in both figures is similar—homeowners tend to default before 
they file for bankruptcy.   But homeowners who file for bankruptcy are much more likely to 
default than the reverse—eventually, 77% of homeowners with prime mortgages and 94% of 
homeowners with subprime mortgages default if they have filed for bankruptcy.  This suggests 
that homeowners are generally not filing for bankruptcy in order to save their homes or, if they 
do, then most do not succeed.  Instead, they are filing for bankruptcy to reduce the cost of losing 
their homes.  
      We also examine the timing of the bankruptcy-foreclosure relationship.  We set the date 
when lenders start the foreclosure process at zero and calculate the probability that homeowners 
file for bankruptcy each month before and after.  The sample consists of all mortgages in which 
foreclosure starts.  Figure 5 shows that nearly all homeowners file for bankruptcy right around 
the time lenders start foreclosure.  Eventually, 18% and 72% of homeowners with prime and 
subprime mortgages who experience foreclosure also file for bankruptcy, respectively.   
Similarly, figure 6 shows the cumulative probability of foreclosure conditional on homeowners 
filing for bankruptcy.    Lenders begin foreclosure for 44% and 72% of prime and subprime 
mortgages, respectively, conditional on homeowners’ filing for bankruptcy.    
      The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we examine homeowners’ incentives to 
default and file for bankruptcy in the context of the U.S. legal environment.   We also examine 
the various ways in which homeowners in financial distress gain from coordinating their default 
and bankruptcy decisions and develop testable hypotheses concerning how their default and 
bankruptcy decisions are related.  We also consider how homeowners can reduce their losses 
from foreclosure by filing for bankruptcy.   In section III, we discuss our mortgage dataset in 
greater detail.  In section IV, we give the results of hazard models that examine the relationships 
between bankruptcy and mortgage default and between bankruptcy and foreclosure.   In section 
V, we discuss policy implications.     5 
 
 
II.  Homeowners’ Decisions to Default and File for Bankruptcy under U.S. Law 
       In this section, we consider homeowners’ incentives to default and file for bankruptcy in the 
U.S. legal environment.  We also consider how the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the start of the 
mortgage crisis changed homeowners’ incentives.
  
         Suppose homeowners default on their mortgage payments.   Lenders generally begin the 
foreclosure process once homeowners are delinquent by two or three months.  States vary in how 
long and how formal the foreclosure process is.  In some states mortgage lenders can proceed 
without going to court, while in other states they must obtain a court order.  Eventually the 
lender obtains legal title to the property and sells it.  The proceeds after expenses are used, first, 
to repay the first mortgage in full, including principal, interest, fees, and penalties.  Next, the 
second mortgage and home equity loans, if any, are repaid in full in order.  Third, homeowners 
receive an amount up the state’s homestead exemption.   Homestead exemptions vary widely 
across states, from zero in a few states to unlimited in seven states.   If anything is left, it goes to 
unsecured creditors.   In most foreclosures, the sale price of the house is insufficient to repay the 
mortgage(s)—otherwise homeowners would have sold the house themselves.  Some states allow 
mortgage lenders to obtain a “deficiency judgment” against the former owner, which is an 
unsecured claim for the difference between the amount of the mortgage and the sale price of the 
house.
3  Most states also allow homeowners to reclaim their houses for a period after foreclosure 
by repaying their mortgages in full.  These periods can last up to a year.     
       Homeowners who default can remain in their homes for varying periods.  Some states force 
them to leave before the transfer of title to the lender.  Others allow them to stay, which means 
that they become tenants and the new owner must go through an eviction procedure to force 
them to leave.  During this process, homeowners/former homeowners are not obliged to make 
any mortgage or rent payments.  The period from default to eviction ranges from a few months to 
more than a year—and homeowners can extend it by filing for bankruptcy.     
                                                            
3 To prevent mortgage lenders from selling foreclosed homes for less than market value, many 
states allow deficiency judgments only if the foreclosure process has gone through the courts.  
See Elias (2009) for discussion of foreclosure law.  6 
 
       Now suppose homeowners default on non-mortgage debt.  Credit card lenders use 
aggressive collection techniques, including frequently calling the debtor at home and at work and 
sending threatening letters.  Lenders may also obtain a court order to garnish debtors’ wages if 
they can determine where debtors work and to seize debtors’ bank accounts if they can locate 
these accounts.  Federal law prevents lenders from garnishing more than 25% of debtors’ wages.   
Some states restrict garnishment further and a few states prohibit it entirely.
4    
       Now consider homeowners’ decisions to default on their mortgages.  Homeowners may 
default because their ability-to-pay falls or they may default strategically, because doing so 
makes them better off.  Suppose PVCO  denotes the net present value of the cost of owning a 
home, including the value of home equity,  expected future capital gains or losses on the house, 
and the cost of paying the mortgage.  PVCR denotes the net present value of the cost of  
alternative housing, which we assumed is rented.   Homeowners gain from defaulting if PVCO < 
PVCR.   They are less likely to default if they have positive home equity, if they expect home 
values to rise in the future and/or if they have particularly favorable mortgage terms (such as 
below-market interest rates).    
      Now turn to bankruptcy and consider how filing for bankruptcy affects homeowners’ gain 
from defaulting on their mortgages.
 5   There are two separate personal bankruptcy procedures in 
the U.S., called Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and most homeowners are allowed to choose between 
them.  Filing for bankruptcy under either chapter stops creditors’ collection efforts, prevents or 
ends wage garnishment, and stops the foreclosure process—at least temporarily.   Some or all 
unsecured debts—including credit card debts, installment loans, medical bills, and unpaid rent—
are discharged.        
      Consider Chapter 7 first.   In Chapter 7, unsecured debts are quickly discharged,
 6 but  
mortgage debt cannot be changed or discharged.
 7  Debtors are obliged to use assets above their 
                                                            
4 See Mann (2006) for discussion of collection practices by credit card lenders.  
5 See White and Zhu (2010)  and Lin and White (2001) for detailed discussions of the 
relationship between homeowners’ default and bankruptcy decisions.   Fay, Hurst, and White 
(2003) show empirically that debtors are more likely to file for bankruptcy when their financial 
gain from filing is higher.   
6 Not all unsecured debts are discharged in bankruptcy—debts that are not discharged include 
unpaid child support,  taxes, debts incurred by fraud, and student loans (the latter can 
occasionally be discharged under a hardship procedure).      7 
 
state’s exemption level to repay unsecured debt, but they are not obliged to repay from their 
future incomes—even if their earnings are high.  States have separate exemptions for different 
types of assets, but the homestead exemption is generally the largest.  In states with high 
homestead exemptions, even debtors with high assets do not have to repay any of their unsecured 
debt in bankruptcy, as long as they convert their assets into exempt home equity before filing.
8   
       Chapter 7 can help financially distressed homeowners save their homes by discharging some 
of their unsecured debts, thus making additional funds available to pay the mortgage.  Because 
foreclosure is stopped during the bankruptcy proceeding, homeowners also get several extra 
months to repay mortgage arrears.
9  They are allowed to keep their homes in Chapter 7 as long as 
their home equity is less than their state’s homestead exemption and they repay the arrears within 
a few months.  In terms of the bankruptcy-default relationship, this discussion suggests that 
homeowners who wish to save their homes and succeed may be observed in bankruptcy only or 
in bankruptcy and in default.  But they will not be observed in foreclosure.   
     However, homeowners also gain from filing under Chapter 7 if they do not intend to save 
their homes.  If they have positive home equity, then using bankruptcy to delay foreclosure gives 
them more time to sell their homes privately, which may bring a higher price.  If homeowners do 
not have positive home equity, then filing for bankruptcy allows them to live in their homes cost-
free for longer.  Homeowners who default also have an incentive to file for bankruptcy because 
default lowers their credit scores and this means that the cost of filing for bankruptcy is low.  In 
addition, homeowners who have already lost their homes and are subject to deficiency judgments 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 The prohibition on changing mortgage terms in bankruptcy is based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank, 508 US 324 (1993) and on 11 U.S.C. § 
1322(b)(2), which prevents bankruptcy judges from discharging mortgage debt that is secured 
only by a primary residence that is a single-family house, even if the value of the house is below 
the mortgage principle.  But second mortgages are sometimes discharged in bankruptcy—see 
below.  For discussion, see Bourguignon (2007) and Levitin and Goodman (2008).   
8 Bankruptcy law in the U.S. is Federal law, so that it is uniform all over the country.  But U.S. 
bankruptcy law allows states to set their own asset exemptions.   
9 Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) first suggested that filing for bankruptcy increases debtors’ ability 
to repay their mortgages by discharging unsecured debt.   But see Carroll and Li (2008) for data 
showing that homeowners who file for bankruptcy to save their homes often fail.  
 8 
 
gain from filing under Chapter 7 in order to have the deficiency judgments discharged.   Thus 
homeowners who do not try to save their homes are likely to be observed in default, in 
bankruptcy, and in foreclosure.    
           Homeowners’ gain from filing under Chapter 7 can be expressed as:  
7 7 7 7 ] 0 , max[ 7 C X A R H U r GainChapte A − − − − + =  
7 U is the value of unsecured debt discharged in Chapter 7.  Homeowners receive this subsidy in 
bankruptcy regardless of whether they keep their homes or not.   7 H is the change in the present 
value of future housing costs when homeowners file under Chapter 7.  If homeowners save their 
homes in Chapter 7, then  0 7 = H .   But if they give up their homes in Chapter 7, then 7 H  equals 
the reduction in housing costs from becoming renters, or  ) ( 7 7 PVCR PVCO − .  This may include 
the gain from having cost-free housing for several months by delaying foreclosure, the gain from 
having a deficiency judgment discharged, and/or the gain from moving to rental housing that 
costs less.  If homeowners make efficient housing choices, then 
)] ( , 0 max[ 7 7 7 PVCR PVCO H − = .   ] 0 , max[ A X A− is the value of non-exempt assets that 
homeowners must use to repay unsecured debt in bankruptcy, where A is the value of 
homeowners’ assets and  A X  is the asset exemption (equal to the homestead exemption in most 
states).    7 C  is homeowners’ cost of filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.   
     Overall, the discussion of Chapter 7 bankruptcy suggests that financially distressed 
homeowners are likely both to file for bankruptcy and to default.  If they fail to save their homes, 
then they will also be observed in foreclosure.   But homeowners who prefer to give up their 
homes are also likely to be observed in default, in bankruptcy and in foreclosure.  This suggests 
that bankruptcy and default tend to be complements for financially distressed homeowners, 
regardless of whether they attempt to save their homes or not, and that bankruptcy and 
foreclosure are also complements for homeowners who do not attempt to save their homes or 
who try but fail.      
       Now turn to Chapter 13.   It is intended as a procedure for financially distressed homeowners 
to save their homes, even if they have large mortgage arrears that they cannot repay in a lump 9 
 
sum.   Homeowners must have regular earnings and they must follow a court-supervised 
repayment plan for 3 to 5 years.  If they succeed in repay their mortgage arrears as part of the 
plan and also keep current on their normal mortgage payments, then the original mortgage 
contract will be reinstated.
10  The terms of first mortgages cannot otherwise be changed in 
Chapter 13.  But second mortgages and home equity loans can be discharged in Chapter 13 if the 
loan is underwater and some car loans can also be reduced in Chapter 13.  Bankruptcy trustees 
also may challenge fees and penalties that lenders add to mortgages following default.
 11   Prior 
to the 2005 bankruptcy reform, homeowners were generally not required to repay any of their 
unsecured debt in Chapter 13, as long as their assets were entirely exempt.
12     
        To illustrate a Chapter 13 plan, suppose a homeowner owes $8,000 in past due mortgage 
payments, plus $2,000 in penalties and late fees.  The homeowner’s normal monthly mortgage 
payment is $800 per month.  The homeowner cannot repay the $10,000 in full immediately.  But 
under Chapter 13, she is allowed to repay the arrears over 3 to 5 years as part of her repayment 
plan.  At an interest rate of 6% and with the bankruptcy trustee adding a 10% fee, the cost of 
repaying the mortgage arrears over 5 years is $203 per month.   She must also make her normal 
mortgage payments of $800/month.   Thus during the plan, her monthly mortgage costs are 
$1,003 per month.    
       Homeowners’ gain from filing under Chapter 13 can be expressed as:  
. ] 0 , max[ 13 13 13 13 13 13 C X A E H S U r GainChapte A − − − − + + =  
 Here  13 U  is the value of unsecured debt discharged in Chapter 13.   13 S  is the value of non-
housing secured debt (car loans) discharged in Chapter 13.   13 H  is the reduction in the cost of 
                                                            
10 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1) allows debtors to cure defaults on their mortgages in Chapter 13.    
11 See Porter (2009) and Elias (2009) for discussion.    
12 Prior to 2005, bankruptcy judges generally approved repayment plans that did not require 
homeowners to repay any unsecured debt, as long as all of their assets would be exempt in 
Chapter 7.  The justification was that these homeowners could otherwise file under Chapter 7, 
where their unsecured debts would be completely discharged.   If homeowners’ home equity was 
not completely exempt, then they were also obliged to use their non-exempt home equity to 
repay unsecured debt.  This is because bankruptcy law requires that unsecured creditors receive 
at least as much in Chapter 13 as they would in Chapter 7.   10 
 
housing when homeowners file under Chapter 13.  If homeowners keep their homes, then 
13 13 PVCO H Δ = , where  13 PVCO Δ equals the value of second mortgage loans, home equity loans, 
and/or fees and penalties that are discharged in Chapter 13.  If homeowners shift to rental 
housing, then   13 13 13 PVCR PVCO H − = , or the reduction in housing costs when homeowners 
shift to rental housing.   13 E  is the present value of future earnings that must be used to repay 
unsecured debt in Chapter 13 (if any) and  ] 0 , max[ A X A− is again the value of non-exempt assets 
(if any) that must be used to repay unsecured debt.    13 C  is the cost of filing for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 13.   
      Comparing homeowners’ gain from filing for bankruptcy under Chapters 7 versus 13, both 
the costs and benefits of filing are generally higher under Chapter 13.  Under Chapter 13, more 
types of unsecured debt are discharged than in Chapter 7, some car loans are also discharged, and 
the reduction in the cost of owning is larger than in Chapter 7.  Thus  7 13 U U > ,  7 13 H H > , and 
0 13 > S .   Prior to the 2005 bankruptcy reform, Chapter 13 filers generally repaid only a token 
amount of unsecured debt, so that  13 E  was small.   And prior to bankruptcy reform, debtors 
generally did not repay any of their debts from non-exempt assets, so that  ] 0 , max[ A X A− = 0.   
But the costs of filing for bankruptcy are higher in Chapter 13, so that  7 13 C C > .    Thus both the 
benefits and costs of filing for bankruptcy are larger under Chapter 13 than Chapter 7.     
       This discussion suggests that our predictions concerning the bankruptcy/default and 
bankruptcy/foreclosure associations are similar for homeowners who file under Chapter 7 and  
under Chapter 13.  Because few debtors choose Chapter 13 unless they are homeowners trying to 
save their homes, the discussion suggests that Chapter 13 filers are also likely to be observed 
both in bankruptcy and in default.  As in Chapter 7, they will not be observed in foreclosure if 
they succeed in saving their homes.  Thus bankruptcy and default are predicted to be 
complements for financially distressed homeowners, but bankruptcy and foreclosure are 
predicted to be less strongly complementary as long as some homeowners successfully use 
bankruptcy to save their homes.     If we find the bankruptcy/foreclosure relationship to be as 
strongly complementary as the bankruptcy/default relationship, then this will suggest that 
homeowners do not use bankruptcy to save their homes.  11 
 
       Now consider the 2005 bankruptcy reform and how it changed homeowners’ gain from 
filing for bankruptcy.   First, bankruptcy costs  7 C and 13 C increased substantially, thus 
discouraging all homeowners from filing for bankruptcy.  Second, a new means test was 
introduced that prevents some homeowners with incomes above the median level in their states 
from filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.   Third, Chapter 13 became less attractive because a 
new procedure requires some filers with above-median incomes to repay part of their unsecured 
debt, thus increasing  13 E .  Also the criterion for discharging car loans in Chapter 13 was 
tightened, thus reducing  13 S .   Finally, a cap of $125,000 on the homestead exemption was 
introduced for homeowners who live in states with high homestead exemptions and have lived in 
their homes for less than 3½ years.  This raises  ] 0 , max[ A X A−  and discourages some high-asset 
homeowners from filing.
 13   
         Overall, the 2005 bankruptcy reform is predicted to reduce the number of homeowners who 
file for bankruptcy.   And because financially distressed homeowners who do not file for 
bankruptcy do not receive the debt discharge and mortgage payment delay that bankruptcy 
provides, the reform is also predicted to increase default and foreclosure.   
        The mortgage crisis also affected homeowners’ incentives to default and to file for 
bankruptcy, mainly by reducing home values and therefore wiping out many homeowners’ home 
equity.   The reduction in home equity raises the cost of continuing to own, while leaving 
unaffected the cost of renting.  It therefore encourages homeowners to default on their mortgages 
and give up their homes.  But if bankruptcy and mortgage default are complements, then the 
reduction in home equity could also cause bankruptcy filings to rise.  In the empirical section, we 
examine whether more default and foreclosure occur when home equity is negative, which is 
more likely after the beginning of the mortgage crisis.   We also examine whether homeowners 
are more likely to file for bankruptcy when their home equity is completely exempt, which is 
also more likely after the beginning of the mortgage crisis.  With no non-exempt home equity, 
homeowners are more likely to file for bankruptcy because they are allowed to keep their homes.    
                                                            
13 Ten states plus the District of Columbia have homestead exemptions greater than $125,000.  
See Elias (2007) and earlier editions.    12 
 
         In the next section, we estimate regressions explaining default and foreclosure as a function 
of past bankruptcy and regressions explaining bankruptcy as a function of past default and past 
foreclosure.   These regressions allow us to examine whether default and bankruptcy and 
foreclosure and bankruptcy are complements or substitutes when we add control variables and 
they also allow us to determine how strong the relationships are.  We also examine how the  
2005 bankruptcy reform and the mortgage crisis affected default rates, bankruptcy filings, and 
foreclosures.
 14   Finally we test whether default, foreclosure and bankruptcy are more likely in 
neighborhoods where more defaults, more foreclosures and more bankruptcies have occurred in 
the past.  
     
III.  Data and Summary Statistics 
         Our data, from LPS Applied Analytics, Inc., consist of a large sample of prime and 
subprime mortgages that originated in 2004-2005.   All mortgages are first liens and have  30 
year terms.  We follow them monthly until they are repaid in full (including being transferred to 
a different mortgage servicer), the mortgage terminates with foreclosure or a short sale, or until 
October 2008.   We take a 2% random draw of prime mortgages and a 15% random draw of 
subprime mortgages.  This gives us between 90,000 and 100,000 mortgages of each type and 
between 2.5 and 3.0 million monthly mortgage observations of each type. 
15   All regressions use 
the Cox proportional hazard model and we run all regressions separately for prime and subprime 
mortgages. Summary statistics are shown in table 2.   
       It should be noted that we do not interpret these regressions as causal, since homeowners 
presumably make both their default and bankruptcy decisions as part of an overall plan to save or 
give up their homes, thus raising endogeneity issues.  Similarly, although lenders decide whether 
to start foreclosure, homeowners anticipate that the start of foreclosure will follow default in a 
predictable way.  But the regressions indicate the significance and the strength of the 
                                                            
14 See Morgan et al (2008) and Li, White, and Zhu (2009) for discussion of whether bankruptcy 
reform contributed to the mortgage crisis.   
15 We take a larger sample of subprime mortgages because they are underrepresented in the LPS 
data.  The size of the sample is limited by our use of the hazard model, which can only be 
estimated with smaller sample sizes than models such as probit or OLS.   13 
 
default/bankruptcy and foreclosure/bankruptcy relationships and whether these relationships 
remain complementary when we introduce controls.   
        Control variables used in the regressions include the homeowner’s FICO score in bins (the 
highest category is omitted), the homeowner’s debt-to-income ratio, a dummy variable for 
missing debt-to-income ratio, whether the homeowner provided full documentation of assets and 
income at the time the mortgage originated, whether the property is single-family, whether the 
loan is a jumbo, whether the interest rate is fixed or adjustable, whether the loan is for purchase 
or refinance, whether the lender is private or is one of the U.S. government agencies, whether the 
loan was securitized in the private market (versus securitized by one of the U.S. government 
agencies or held by lenders in their portfolios), and whether the loan was securitized in the 
private market (versus securitized by one of the U.S. government agencies or held by lenders in 
their portfolios), and the source of the loan (whether it was originated by client organization 
(retail), wholesale, correspondent or other).    All of these variables are given at the time of 
mortgage origination and are not updated.  Variables that are updated each month include a 
dummy variable that equals one if the homeowner has negative home equity or a dummy 
variable that equals one if the homeowner has no non-exempt home equity,
16  the age of the loan 
in months, age squared, and a measure of the benefit of refinancing (a higher value indicates a 
larger benefit from refinancing).
17   We also include the unemployment rate in the county during 
the previous month, the rate of growth of house prices in the metropolitan area during the 
previous month, the rate of growth of income in the state during the previous month, a dummy 
                                                            
16 The negative home equity dummy equals one if the market value of the home at the time of 
origination, corrected by the change in average housing values in the metropolitan area since 
origination, minus the current mortgage principal is negative.  This variable is used in the 
regressions explaining default and foreclosure.  The no non-exempt home equity dummy equals 
one if home equity minus the homestead exemption is negative.  This variable is used in the 
regressions explaining bankruptcy.  Note that we do not have information on second mortgages 
or home equity loans.  This means that our negative home equity and negative non-exempt home 
equity are both biased downward.    
17 Following the literature, we use Principal/Value (PVt) as a measure of the benefit of 
refinancing (Richard and Roll, 1989).  PVt measures the present value of future payments on the 
existing mortgage relative to the present value of future payments on an alternate mortgage 
having the currently-available interest rate.  PVt={rt[1-(1+r0)
t-M]}/{ r0[1-(1+rt)
t-M], where rt and r0 
are the currently-available interest rate and the current mortgage interest rate, and M is the 
number of months to maturity.  The mortgage principal and the number of months to maturity 
are assumed to remain the same over time. 14 
 
variable for whether the state allows deficiency judgments, and either the average mortgage 
default rate, bankruptcy rate or foreclosure rate in the homeowner’s zipcode during the previous 
month.
18  We include state and year dummies in all regressions.   Standard errors are clustered by 
mortgage.    
 
IV.  Results  
      Table 3 shows the results of estimating hazard regressions that explain homeowners’ 
bankruptcy decisions  as a function of whether they previously defaulted on their mortgages and 
other variables.   Results that are greater than/less than one are interpreted as percentage 
increases/decreases in the probability of bankruptcy when right-hand-side dummy variables 
change from zero to one or when right-hand-side continuous variables increase by one in value.   
Results are shown separately for prime versus subprime mortgages.  Only some of the control 
variables are shown.      
      The main result is that defaulting on a mortgage is associated with a statistically significant 
increase in homeowners’ probability of filing for bankruptcy.   For homeowners with prime 
mortgages, the probability of filing for bankruptcy increases 16-fold in the period 1-3 months 
after default, or from an average value of .00046 per month to .0074 per month.  Their 
probability of filing for bankruptcy also increases 4-fold in the period 4-6 months after default 
and by 50% in the period 7-24 months after default.  For homeowners with subprime mortgages, 
the increase in the period 1-3 months after default is 14-fold, or from an average value of .0018 
per month  to .026 per month.  The increases in the periods 4-6 months and 7-24 months after 
default are  nearly 2-fold, and 42%, respectively.  All of these results are strongly statistically 
significant.     Thus default and bankruptcy are complementary even when control variables are 
introduced.  We also find that homeowners with prime and subprime mortgages are about half as 
likely to file for bankruptcy after the 2005 bankruptcy reform went into effect.  Homeowners 
who have no non-exempt home equity are 92% more likely to file for bankruptcy if they have 
prime mortgages and 39% more likely to file for bankruptcy if they have subprime mortgages.   
These relationships are also statistically significant.      
                                                            
18 The lagged mortgage default rates, bankruptcy rates and foreclosure rates by zipcode are 
calculated from our data.   The deficiency judgment is taken from Pence (2006).   15 
 
        Among the control variables, homeowners are also more likely to file for bankruptcy if the 
lagged bankruptcy filing rate in the zipcode is higher:  an increase of one percent in the lagged 
bankruptcy filing rate doubles homeowners’ probability of filing for bankruptcy if they have 
prime mortgages and raises their probability of filing by 33% if they have subprime mortgages.  
Macroeconomic influences also have the predicted effects:  both types of homeowners are more 
likely to file for bankruptcy if the local unemployment rate is higher, subprime mortgage-holders 
are less likely to file for bankruptcy if the rate of house price increase in the local area is higher, 
and prime mortgage-holders are less likely to file for bankruptcy if the growth rate of income in 
the area is higher.   Subprime mortgage-holders are 22% more likely to file for bankruptcy if 
their mortgages are investor-owned, i.e., have been securitized, which suggests that these 
homeowners are in worse financial condition even after controlling for credit score and other 
financial indicators. 
19     
       Table 4 gives the results explaining homeowners’ decisions to default on their mortgages.   
Again the results show a strong positive relationship between homeowners’ default decisions and  
whether they previously filed for bankruptcy.   Filing for bankruptcy is associated with a 4-fold 
increase in the homeowners’ default rate in the next 1-3 months if they have prime mortgages, or 
an increase from an average rate of .0055 to .022 per month.  The increase for homeowners with  
subprime mortgages is two-fold, or from an average rate of  .025 to .052 per month.   After 3 
months, the relationships are still positive, but insignificant.   These results also suggest that 
bankruptcy and default are complements.  The adoption of bankruptcy reform caused 
homeowners to default on their mortgages 19% more often if they have prime mortgages and 
24%  more often if they have subprime mortgages.  Together with the results in table 3, these 
results support our predictions that bankruptcy reform caused homeowners both to file for 
bankruptcy less often and to default more often.   Homeowners with subprime mortgages are also 
69% more likely to default if they have negative home equity, but the relationship is not 
significant for prime mortgages.    
      Among the control variables, homeowners are also slightly more likely to default if they live 
in an area with a higher unemployment rate and much less likely to default if they live in an area 
                                                            
19 This supports the view that investor-owned mortgages are less likely to be renegotiated.   See 
Piskorski et al (2009).   16 
 
with higher house price growth.  The lagged default rate is also a significant determinant of 
whether homeowners default.   An increase of one percent in the lagged default rate in the 
zipcode increases homeowners’ probability of defaulting by 17% if they have prime mortgages 
and by 21% if they have subprime mortgages.   Thus default causes more default for both types 
of mortgages.    
     Now turn to the bankruptcy/foreclosure relationship.   Table 5 gives the results of regressions 
explaining homeowners’ bankruptcy decisions as a function of whether lenders have already 
started foreclosure proceedings.   The results show a surprisingly strong relationship.   
Homeowners with prime and subprime mortgages are 28 times and 22 times as likely to file for 
bankruptcy, respectively, if lenders began foreclosure within the previous three months.   After 
three months, the relationship is either insignificant or has the wrong sign.  This compares with 
16-fold and 22-fold increases in homeowners’ probabilities of filing for bankruptcy in the same 
period after default, respectively.  The fact that the bankruptcy/foreclosure relationship is 
stronger than the bankruptcy/default relationship for prime mortgage-holders is surprising, since 
we predicted the opposite.  These results suggest that many homeowners often begin to plan 
whether to save versus abandon their homes only when lenders start foreclosure—perhaps 
because they consult lawyers at this point.      
     Finally, table 6 gives the results of regressions explaining the foreclosure/bankruptcy 
relationship.  The results show again that the two are strongly positively related.  The probability 
of foreclosure increases 7-fold for prime mortgages and 2- to 4-fold for subprime mortgages if 
homeowners filed for bankruptcy one to six months earlier.  At the average values, the increase 
in the probability of foreclosure when bankruptcy occurs is from .001 to .007 per month for 
prime mortgages and from .0068 to .024 per month for subprime mortgages.  The adoption of 
bankruptcy reform also caused foreclosures to increase, by 48% for prime mortgages and by 
17% for subprime mortgages.    Foreclosure is also more likely when homeowners have negative 
home equity, although the relationship is only statistically significant for subprime mortgage-
holders.  The increase is 44% for this group.  Lastly, the results suggest that foreclosures cause 
more foreclosures.   The probability of foreclosure rises by a factor of 1.6 for prime mortgages 
when the lagged foreclosure rate in the zipcode for prime mortgages rises by one percent, or an 
increase in homeowners’ average probability of being foreclosed from .001 to .0016 per month.  17 
 
The increase for subprime mortgages is by a factor of nearly 6, or from .0068 to .040 per month.  
Thus foreclosures in the neighborhood are extremely contagious!     
      Overall, these results provide strong evidence that mortgage default and bankruptcy are 
complements and that bankruptcy and foreclosure are also complements, even when we add 
control variables.  But they suggest that homeowners responded to the 2005 bankruptcy reform 
by treating bankruptcy as a substitute for default and foreclosure.  We also found that 
homeowners reacted to the mortgage crisis and the fall in housing prices by both defaulting and 
filing for bankruptcy more often.  Finally we found evidence that default, bankruptcy, and 
particularly foreclosure all tend to spread.               
 
V.  Policy Implications  
       Our results suggest that bankruptcy and default are closely related, as are bankruptcy and 
foreclosure.   Both relationships are complementary, although the 2005 bankruptcy reform 
caused bankruptcy filings to drop and defaults and foreclosures to increase—suggesting that 
homeowners treated bankruptcy as a substitute for default and foreclosure in responding to the 
reform.   We also found that the drop in home prices that occurred in 2007 and 2008 caused 
homeowners both to default and to file for bankruptcy more often, which suggests that they 
treated bankruptcy and default as complements.   Finally we found evidence that default, 
bankruptcy and foreclosure all spread, i.e., they rise when the lagged default, bankruptcy and 
foreclosure rates in the neighborhood are higher.     
       The fact that bankruptcy is closely related to mortgage default and foreclosure is important 
for policy purposes, because foreclosures have very high and negative social costs.  Mortgage 
lenders lose when foreclosures occur, because by the time foreclosed houses are sold, around 
one-third of the value of the loan is lost (Campbell et al, 2008).   Nonetheless, lenders bear only 
part of the costs of foreclosure.   Homeowners who experience foreclosure also lose because they 
are forced to move, which destroys their neighborhood ties, leaves some of them homeless, and 18 
 
increases their children’s chance of dropping out of school before graduating.
20  Foreclosures 
also reduce the value of nearby homes, harming other homeowners and their mortgage lenders.  
Sale prices of homes fall by 7-9% when foreclosures occur within one-tenth of a mile and by 1-
2% when foreclosures occur within one-quarter mile (Campbell et al, 2008).
21   Renters are also 
harmed when landlords default and rental housing units are foreclosed, because leases are 
abruptly terminated and renters are forced to bear the costs of unexpected moves.   Foreclosures 
also harm neighborhoods because vacant homes deteriorate, causing neighborhoods to become 
blighted.   Foreclosures also harm local governments, because property taxes are their main 
source of revenue.  When property values fall, tax revenues fall, and local governments are 
forced to cut expenditures on schools, police and other local public services.  Finally, our 
regression results show that defaults lead to more defaults and foreclosures lead to more 
foreclosures.   Since mortgage lenders bear only a part of these costs, they tend to foreclose too 
often.
22     
        The relationship between bankruptcy and mortgage default/foreclosure has a number of 
policy implications.  First, consider the 2005 bankruptcy reform.  Our results suggest that 
homeowners responded to the reform by filing for bankruptcy less often and lenders responded 
to the reform by foreclosing more often.   These results imply that the 2005 reform led to about 
250,000 extra foreclosures per year during the past few years.
23  Congress is considering new 
legislation that would offset some of the pro-creditor changes made in 2005, such as dropping 
                                                            
20 Green and White (1997) show that children are less likely to graduate from high school and 
more likely to have children as teenagers when their parents move more frequently.    
21 See Campbell et al (2008) and Immergluck and Smith (2006).   
22 Bankruptcy filings also have some external costs that are not borne by the debtor and the 
debtor’s lenders, but these costs are mainly borne by debtors’ families.  But we expect debtors to 
internalize the cost of bankruptcy to the extent that these costs fall on their families. 
23 This figure is based on 32,000,000 mortgage originations in 2004-06, of which approximately 
18% were subprime.  Using our foreclosure rates of .001 per month for prime mortgages and 
.0068 per month for subprime mortgages and our estimates that bankruptcy reform was 
associated with increases in the foreclosure rate of 48% for prime mortgages and 17% for 
subprime mortgages, this gives us a figure of 32,000,000*(.82*.0011*.48 + .18*.0074*.17)*12 
months = 250,000 additional foreclosures due to bankruptcy reform.  The number of mortgages 
originated in 2004-06 and the breakdown of mortgage originations between prime and subprime 
are taken from Mayer and Pence (2008).   Note that Mayer and Pence give a range of figures for 
the breakdown of mortgages between prime versus subprime, based on different definitions of 
subprime mortgages.  We use the average of their high versus low figures.   19 
 
the means test for debtors who have substantial medical debt.
24   To the extent that this change 
would increase the number of bankruptcy filings, our results suggest that they would cause 
foreclosures to drop.        
       Now turn to the implications of the foreclosure/bankruptcy nexus for optimal bankruptcy 
policy.   Bankruptcy policy can be thought of as a set of punishments imposed on debtors for 
defaulting and filing for bankruptcy.  Sanctions in the past have included enslaving and 
imprisoning bankrupts; current sanctions include humiliating them and imposing harsher or more 
lenient repayment requirements.  U.S. bankruptcy law uses humiliation as a punishment for  
bankruptcy by making filers’ names public information, but it has very lenient repayment 
requirements since few bankrupts are required to repay from their future incomes.  Other 
countries have harsher punishments and more onerous repayment requirements than the U.S.—
British law bars bankrupts from managing a business or holding some public offices for three 
years and France requires that they use all of their future incomes above a poverty-level 
exemption for 8-10 years to repay.  Other countries do not allow discharge of debt until the 
debtor dies.
25  When punishments and repayment requirements in bankruptcy are low, risk-
averse debtors benefit from having partial wealth insurance, since they can file for bankruptcy 
and avoid repaying their debts when their ability-to-pay turns out to be low.  The lower the 
punishments and repayment requirements in bankruptcy, the more wealth insurance bankruptcy 
provides to debtors, the more often they file, and the more lenders reduce the supply of credit.
26  
Optimal bankruptcy law is determined by this trade-off between the debtors’ gain from having 
additional wealth insurance and debtors’ losses from having reduced access to credit.
 27       
          Introducing the connection between bankruptcy and foreclosure changes optimal 
bankruptcy law, since we have shown that bankruptcy law affects both the number of 
bankruptcies and the number of foreclosures.  And because foreclosures have high external costs,  
bankruptcy law should be set so as to take into account its effect on foreclosures.  But deriving 
prescriptions for how optimal bankruptcy law should change because of the 
bankruptcy/foreclosure relationship is tricky because the two are substitutes in some contexts and 
                                                            
24 The bill is H.R. 901, “Medical Bankruptcy Fairness Act.” 
25 See White (2007) for comparison of bankruptcy laws across countries.   
26See, for example,  Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) and Lin and White (2003).   
27 See Livshits et al (2007) for a calibration model of optimal bankruptcy.   20 
 
complements in others.   We showed in general that they are complements.  This suggests that 
optimal bankruptcy law shifts in a pro-creditor direction, because higher repayment requirements 
and harsher punishments in bankruptcy reduce bankruptcies and therefore reduce foreclosures.   
But in responding to the 2005 bankruptcy reform, homeowners treated bankruptcy and 
foreclosure as complements and this suggests that making bankruptcy law more pro-debtor 
would reduce foreclosures.   Thus the policy implications of the bankruptcy-foreclosure nexus 
vary depending on context.      
        The bankruptcy/foreclosure relationship also has implications for other policies that 
influence the number of bankruptcy filings and therefore the number of foreclosures.   One such 
policy is that of protecting debtors’ wages from garnishment by creditors outside of bankruptcy.   
Under U.S. law, a minimum of 75% of wages is protected from garnishment in all states, but 
some states have higher protection levels and five states prohibit garnishment entirely.  Dawsey 
and Ausubel (2002) show that protecting more wages from garnishment reduces the number of 
bankruptcy filings.
28  Assuming that bankruptcy and foreclosure are complements, a policy of 
protecting additional wages from garnishment will therefore also reduce the number of 
foreclosures.   Thus the optimal level of protection of debtors’ wages from garnishment is higher 
because of the bankruptcy/foreclosure relationship.  Congress also recently adopted changes in 
credit card regulations that prevent lenders from raising interest rates on existing loans.  These 
changes are likely to reduce the number of bankruptcy filings and therefore reduce foreclosures, 
at least in the short run.  Other policies that influence the number of bankruptcy filings should 
also be set in a way that recognizes their effect on foreclosures.     
          The fact that mortgage lenders lose a large fraction of their loans when they foreclose 
suggests that they often would be better off if they voluntarily reduced homeowners’ mortgage 
payments and allowed homeowners to remain in their homes, rather than foreclosing.  However 
lenders have resisted reducing mortgage payments and mainly chose foreclosure when default 
occurs.  Two explanations have been proposed for lenders’ unwillingness to change the terms of 
mortgages.  One is that when mortgages are securitized, a mortgage servicer acts for the lenders 
and most mortgage servicing agreements give servicers strong economic incentives to foreclose 
                                                            
28 We did not test the effect of garnishment law in our regressions, because garnishment laws did 
not change during our period and therefore their effect is captured by our state dummies.   21 
 
rather than to modify mortgage terms.  (Mortgage servicing agreements sometimes explicitly 
prohibit servicers from making modifications.)  The other explanation is that lenders are better 
off if they foreclose.  This is because many homeowners who default will “self-cure” if their 
mortgage terms remain unchanged and many of those whose mortgage payments are reduced end 
up re-defaulting quickly, so that foreclosure is only delayed rather than prevented.
 29   Both 
factors mean that mortgage lenders are better off foreclosing.  But even lenders are better off 
foreclosing, it may be more economically efficient to modify mortgages so as to avoid the high 
external costs of foreclosures.   
        Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have initiated programs to reduce the number of 
foreclosures by encouraging mortgage lenders to lower homeowners’ mortgage payments.  The 
Bush Administration programs were completely unsuccessful.  The Obama Administration’s 
programs have been somewhat more successful and the Administration recently announced that 
500,000 homeowners have had their mortgage payments reduced (Goodman, 2009).  This, 
however, is just a small fraction of the number of foreclosures.  A problem with both the Bush 
and the Obama Administration programs is that while homeowners apply to have their mortgage 
payments reduced, mortgage lenders have the right to veto any changes.  Lenders obviously have 
an interest in approving only a small number of reductions in order to discourage applications by 
homeowners who can afford to pay.   Because lenders have the right to veto and they ignore the 
external costs of foreclosures, these programs prevent too few foreclosures.     
       An alternative approach would be to allow bankruptcy judges to modify or “cram down” 
mortgages.  Under current U.S. law, bankruptcy judges are not allowed to change the terms of 
residential mortgage contracts if the mortgage is secured by the debtor’s primary residence.  But 
if bankruptcy judges were given the power to change the terms of residential mortgages, then 
additional foreclosures could be prevented.  This is because, unlike non-bankruptcy foreclosure-
avoidance programs, mortgage lenders would not have the right to veto changes in mortgage 
terms.  Legislation making this change was proposed by the Obama campaign in the fall of 2008, 
but heavy lobbying by mortgage lenders caused it to be rejected by Congress.
30    
                                                            
29 See Piskorski et al (2009) and Adelino et al (2009) for arguments on both sides.   
30 See Levitin and Goodman (2008) for discussion of the cramdown proposal. 22 
 
       Introducing cram-down of mortgages in bankruptcy would clearly be an additional way of 
preventing foreclosures.   But would it be economically efficient?  Zhu and White (2010) 
examined a sample of financially distressed homeowners in Chapter 13 and found that the 
average present value of debt reduction if mortgages were reduced to the current market value of 
the house would be around $150,000 per homeowner, including reduced mortgage payments of 
$140,000 and unsecured debt discharge of $10,000.   Because this figure is so large, adopting 
cram-down is likely to cause many additional homeowners to file for bankruptcy, including 
many who file only to have their mortgages crammed down.   The study predicted that five 
mortgages would be crammed down in bankruptcy for each foreclosure prevented, so that the 
total cost to lenders would be around $750,000 per foreclosure prevented.  With so many 
mortgage modifications, the supply of mortgage credit would almost certainly fall.  Overall, 
allowing cram-down in bankruptcy would be very effective, but would probably prevent too 
many—rather than too few—foreclosures.     23 
 
 
                                                                       Figure 1: 
Bankruptcy Filings and Mortgage Default Rates,  
Yearly Data, 1980-2008 
 
 














Figure 2:   
Mortgage Default, Bankruptcy, and Foreclosure Rates for Homeowners 
Monthly Household Data, January 2004 to October 2008  








































Figure 3:  




Note:  The figure gives the cumulative probability of bankruptcy depending on months 
before/since default.  Default is defined to occur when mortgage payments are at least one month 




















Figure 4:  
Homeowners’ Cumulative Default Rate Conditional on Bankruptcy 
 
 
Note:  The figure gives the cumulative probability of default depending on months before/since 
bankruptcy.   Default is defined to occur when mortgage payments are at least one month 
delinquent.   The sample is all mortgages in which households file for bankruptcy.  Uses 



















Figure 5:  
 
Homeowners’ Cumulative Bankruptcy Filing Rate Conditional on Foreclosure 
 
 
Note:  The figure gives the cumulative probability of bankruptcy depending on months 
before/since foreclosure.   The sample is all mortgages in which foreclosure starts.   Uses 


















Figure 6:  




Note:  The figure gives the cumulative probability of foreclosure depending on months 

















Table 1: Trends in Bankruptcy Filings, Mortgage Default and Consumer and Mortgage 
Debt 
 Bankruptcy  filings 
per 1,000 HH 
Residential mortgage 
default rate 
1980 3.56  .055 
1981 3.83  .058 
1982 3.72  .062 
1983 3.41  .063 
1984 3.33  .064 
1985 3.93  .068 
1986 5.08  .066 
1987 5.53  .060 
1988 6.03  .060 
1989 6.64  .058 
1990 7.69  .056 
1991 9.25    .060   
1992 9.41  .056 
1993 8.43  .052 
1994 8.03  .050 
1995 8.84  .052 
1996 11.3  .053 
1997 13.3  .054 
1998 13.6  .056 
1999 12.3  .053 
2000 11.6  .056 
2001 13.4  .066 
2002 14.1  .066 
2003 14.6  .060 
2004 14.0  .055 
2005 18.0  .055 
2006 5.24  .058 
2007 7.13  .071 
2008 9.20  .088 
 
Notes:  The mortgage default rate is the dollar value of 1-4 family mortgages that are delinquent by 30 days or more or are 
in foreclosure, divided by the dollar value of all 1-4 family mortgages.   Data are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the 
U.S., various editions, but are produced by the Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey.   The 
number of bankruptcy filings is produced by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; data are available at 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID
=57826.    31 
 
     Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
  Bankruptcy Sample  Default Sample  Foreclosure Sample 
  Prime   Subprime   Prime  Subprime  Prime  Subprime 
Average bankruptcy/default/foreclosure  
rate per month 
0.00046 0.00185  0.0060  0.0274  0.0011  0.0074 
State allows  deficiency judgments  0.7263 0.7393  0.7206 0.7229  0.7264  0.7391 
FICO  (at origination) between 350 and 
550 
0.0092 0.1236  0.0055 0.0964  0.0089  0.1181 
FICO  (at origination) between 550 and 
650 
0.1374 0.6215  0.1157 0.5966  0.1357  0.6178 
FICO  (at origination) between 650 and 
750 
0.5139 0.2319  0.5164 0.2761  0.5146  0.24397 
Houses with negative equity  0.0019  0.0013  0.0018  0.0006  0.0018  0.0009 
If non-exempt home equity is positive   0.7238  0.6396  0.7303  0.6404  0.7265  0.6404 
Debt-to-income ratio (%,at origination)  21.8910  19.2501  21.7224  18.5816  21.9049  0.1919 
Missing debt-to-income ratio at origination  0.3946  0.5129  0.3946  0.5301  0.3942  0.5143 
If full documentation  0.3531  0.5555  0.3556  0.5292  0.3537  0.5508 
Missing documentation  0.1696  0.1193  0.1700  0.1386  0.1702  0.1239 
If single-family house  0.7531  0.8136  0.7506  0.8067  0.7535  0.8125 
If fixed rate mortgage  0.6416  0.2861  0.6443  0.3106  0.6431  0.2962 
If jumbo loan  0.1388  0.0948  0.1408  0.1001  0.1384  0.0948 
If loan was for purchase   0.5615  0.4418  0.5598  0.4356  0.5609  0.4357 
If loan was privately securitized  0.2550  0.8586  0.2499  0.8371  0.2530  0.8533 
If loan originated by retail  0.5059  0.4374  0.5173  0.4600  0.5071  0.4433 
If loan originated by wholesale  0.1874  0.1815  0.1853  0.1816  0.1872  0.1804 
If loan originated by correspondent  0.2203  0.1034  0.2172  0.1041  0.2207  0.1037 
Lagged local bankruptcy rate/delinquency 
/foreclosure rate (zipcode) 
0.0004 0.0016  0.0055 0.0247  0.0010  0.0068 
Lagged local unemployment rate 
(%,county) 
4.7636 4.9514  4.7458 4.8894  4.7601  4.9233 
Lagged local income growth rate (state)  0.0013  0.0012  0.0012  0.0010  0.0013  0.0011 
Lagged local house price growth rate (msa)  0.0014  0.0014  0.0016  0.0016  0.0010  0.0015 
Benefit of refinancing (value of existing 
mortgage / value of new mortgage at 
current interest rate) 
1.0801 0.8456  1.0859 0.8647  1.0811  0.8501 
Age of loan (months)  21.4998  18.0530  20.7656  15.0354  21.4490  17.2725 




Hazard Model Results Explaining Bankruptcy as a Function of Past Mortgage Default   
  Prime mortgages  Subprime mortgages 
Default 1-3 months before  16.57*** 14.17*** 
Default 4-6 months before  4.50*** 1.92*** 
Default 7-24 months before  1.50* 1.42** 
Bankruptcy reform dummy  0.50*** 0.52*** 
If no non-exempt home equity  1.92***  1.39*** 
FICO 350-450  3.89***  2.32*** 
FICO 550-650  4.40***  2.28*** 
FICO 650-750  4.60*** 2.71*** 
If full documentation  0.79*** 0.77*** 
Benefit of refinancing  0.45** 0.99 
If mortgage securitized   1.08 1.22** 
Lagged growth of house prices 
(zipcode) 
0.002 0.008** 
Lagged unemployment rate (county)  1.08** 1.03* 
Lagged income growth (state)  0.40* 0.98 
Lagged avg bankruptcy rate (zipcode)  224** 32.85*** 
Deficiency judgments allowed  4.79 1.39 
State and year dummies?  Y Y 
 
            Notes:  The dependent variable is whether homeowners filed for bankruptcy.  *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 4:  
Hazard Model Explaining Mortgage Default as a Function of Past Bankruptcy  
  Prime mortgages  Subprime mortgages 
Bankruptcy 1-3 months before  3.94*** 2.12*** 
Bankruptcy 4-6 months  before  1.97 1.12 
Bankruptcy 7-24 months before  1.70* 0.96 
Bankruptcy reform dummy  1.19*** 1.24*** 
If negative home equity  1.13 1.69*** 
FICO 350-550  13.15** 4.75*** 
FICO 550-650  6.60*** 3.32*** 
FICO 650-750  2.63*** 1.88*** 
If full documentation  0.87*** 0.95*** 
If mortgage securitized   1.15*** 1.02 
Benefit of refinancing  0.35*** 0.20*** 
Lagged growth of house prices (zipcode)  0.003*** 0.007*** 
Lagged unemployment rate (county)  1.07*** 1.01*** 
Lagged income growth (state)  0.76 0.99 
Lagged avg default rate (zipcode)   16.61*** 20.68*** 
Deficiency judgments allowed  0.88 0.83 
State and year dummies?  Y Y 
 
      Notes:  The dependent variable is whether foreclosure started.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.  Results given are given as marginal effects, with percentage changes 
given for variables that are statistically significant.    34 
 
Table 5:  
Hazard Model Results Explaining Bankruptcy as a Function of Past Foreclosure 
  Prime mortgages  Subprime mortgages
Foreclosure 1-3 months before  27.77*** 22.15*** 
Foreclosure 4-6 months  before  0.99 1.03 
Foreclosure  7-24 months before  0.67* 0.86*** 
Bankruptcy reform dummy  0.52*** 0.57*** 
If no nonexempt home equity  1.92*** 1.32*** 
FICO 350-550  10.80*** 3.78*** 
FICO 550-650  8.89*** 3.39*** 
FICO 650-750  6.11*** 3.25*** 
If full documentation  0.78*** 0.82*** 
Benefit of refinancing  0.33*** 0.98 
If mortgage securitized  1.05 1.08 
Lagged growth of house prices (zipcode)  0.006 0.02** 
Lagged unemployment rate (county)  1.08*** 1.02 
Lagged income growth (state)  0.54 0.96 
Lagged avg bankruptcy rate (zipcode)   155** 12.99** 
Deficiency judgments allowed  6.33* 1.36 
State and year dummies?  Y Y 
            Notes:  The dependent variable is whether homeowners filed for bankruptcy.  *, **, and *** indicate 




Hazard Model Results Explaining Foreclosure as a Function of Past Bankruptcy 
  Prime mortgages  Subprime 
mortgages 
Bankruptcy 1-3 months before  7.14*** 2.61*** 
Bankruptcy 4-6 months  before  7.39*** 4.68*** 
Bankruptcy 7-24 months before  1.89* 1.56*** 
Bankruptcy reform dummy  1.48* 1.17* 
If negative home equity  1.59  1.44** 
If mortgage securitized   1.36***  0.98 
FICO 350-550  13.05***  3.98*** 
FICO 550-650  10.25***  3.05*** 
FICO 650-750  3.98*** 1.89*** 
If full documentation  0.80*** 0.87*** 
Benefit of refinancing  0.04*** 0.17*** 
Lagged growth of house prices 
(zipcode) 
0.00*** 0.003*** 
Lagged unemployment rate (county)  1.10*** 1.04*** 
Lagged income growth (state)  0.02*** 0.86 
Lagged avg foreclosure rate (zipcode)   164*** 592*** 
Deficiency judgments allowed  1.59 1.19 
State and year dummies?  Y Y 
            Notes:  The dependent variable is whether foreclosure started.  *, **, and *** indicate 
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